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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARGARET S. MINEER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 14696

BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Defendant and Respondent.
ROBERT W. ROSKELLEY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 14728

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY,
Defendant and Respondent.

Brief of Defendants

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is a consolidated action involving two separate Plaintiffs and common questiodli ·
of law before the Supreme Court of Utah pursuant to UCA 35-4-lO(i), 1953,

as~

for the purpose of Judicial Review of and determination of the lawfulness of decisions of
the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, affirming the decisions of the
Appeals Referees denying benefits to both Plaintiffs and assessing an overpayment against
Plaintiffs on the grounds that each Plaintiff knowingly withheld material facts of his/her
work and earnings to receive benefits to which he/she was not entitled. The questions are
whether the findings of fact are supported by the evidence, construction of Section 35-4-5(e)
of the Utah Employment Security Act, and whether said section as applied violates the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Constitutions of Utah and the United States.
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DISPOSITION BY BOARD OF REVIEW
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Plaintiff Mineer was disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits
. S2 weeks and an overpayment assessed against Plaintiff in the amount of $1,640.00 in a
by a Hearing Representative of the Department of Employment Security dated

Mlmmry· 19, 1976. The decision was affirmed by a Department Appeals Referee in a
dated April 16, 1976, and the decision of the Appeals Referee was affirmed by the

of Review in a decision dated June 30, 1976, in Case No. 76-A-800, 76-BR-85.

for 52 weeks and an overpayment assessed against said Plaintiff in the amount of
in a decision by a Hearing Representative of the Department of Employment
4ated January 26, 1976, as amended February 9, 1976. The decision was affirmed

lllllpartmi:ot Appeals Referee in a decision dated May 4, 1976, and the decision of the
lleferee was affirmed by the Board of Review in a decision dated July 28, 1976,

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants Department of Employment Security and Board of Review of the Industrial
,.,.,;')

c~:·e,

.

.

nssion of Utah seek affirmation of the decisions denying benefits to Plaintiffs and

~overpayments

.,

on the grounds that the findings of fact in each case are supported

hr the evidence and are conclusive; that the findings of fact and decisions comply with
Defendant's regulations; and that Section 35-4-5(e) of the Utah Employment Security Act as
applied does not violate the due process and/or equal protection clauses of the

Constitutions of Utah and the United States.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
(A) PLAINTIFF MINEER
Plaintiff Margaret S. Mineer initiated an interstate claim for unemployment benefits on
September 5, 1974, in Pasco, Washington. Her claim was approved with an effective date of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
September 1, 1974,
and her benefit was determined to be $57.00 per week, not to exceed 36
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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weeks. Plaintiff subsequently filed a new claim for a new bene fit
ff ·
1 year e ective November 2,

s

1975. It was approved and her benefit on this claim was determined t o be 38 .00 per week,
not to exceed 14 weeks. (R0036)
On October 15, 1974, the Plaintiff filed an interstate claim for unemployment benefits
for the calendar weeks ended October 5, 1974, and October 12, 1974, certifying thereon that
she did not work and had no earnings and also that she was not in training or attending
school during said weeks. (R0029)
Plaintiff in fact did work and had earnings during the week ending October 5, 1974,
and knowingly failed to report said material facts regarding her work and earnings to obtain :
benefits to which she was not entitled. (R0019, R0020)
Pursuant to Section 35-4-5(e) of the Utah Employment Security Act, Plaim.tiff . . ~\
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits for the 52-week period •--m111111111lflllil!111

the amount of $1,640.00 for benefits paid to Plaintiff during the disq!l'tlll•l!lltllt;Jlll

(ROOlO)

(B) PLAINTIFF ROSKELLEY
Plaintiff Robert W. Roskelley initiated a claim for unemployment beufits t>ll
1975. His claim was approved and his benefit was determined to be $93.00 per wd.
an effective date of January 5, 1975. Plaintiff subsequently filed a new dllim

flF: .':

claim of $66.00. (R0009)

·'•,

On or about April 20, 1975, the said Plaintiff filed a weekly claim for benefits b • .
week ending April 19, 1975, certifying thereon that he worked no hours and had BO earalap
during said week. (R0030) Plaintiff in fact did work three days and had earnings of $116.U •.
'\;

during said week in question and knowingly failed to report said material facts to

..;;:.··~,
'-. ~.:~

benefits to which he was not entitled. (R0012, R0029, R0032)

...

-. .,

On or about the 27th day of April 1975, the Plaintiff filed a weekly claim for benefits
for the week ending April 26, 1975, certifying thereon that he worked twenty-two hours for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ABC Construction and earned $132.41 during said week ending April 26, 1975, and that he
started work on April 22, 1975. (R0031) Plaintiff in fact started work for said employer on
April 14, 1975, (R0013) and earned $255.04 the week ending April 26, 1975. (R0032)
Pursuant to Section 35-4-5(e) of the Utah Employment Security Act, Plaintiff was
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits for the 52-week period commencing with
the calendar week ending April 19, 1975, and an overpayment was assessed against him in
the amount of $1,674.00 for benefits paid to Plaintiff Roskelley during the disqualification
period. (ROOIO)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANTS' REGULATIONS ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS TO SUSTAIN A DISQUALIFICATION FOR FRAUD AND THE STANDARD OF
PROOF; THE FIVE ELEMENTS SET li'ORTH IN THE REGULATIONS ARE
PRESENT IN EACH OF THESE CASES AND THE DISQUALIFICATION
FOR FRAUD IN EACH WAS PROPERLY IMPOSED: THE FINDINGS OF
THE REFEREE IN EACH CASE ARE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE SAID
REGULATIONS AND ARE VALID. THE ISSUE OF FAULT RAISED BY
THE PLAINTIFFS IS NOT PERTINENT HERE, BUT IF IT DID APPLY THE
REFEREE WOULD BE JUSTIFIED IN FINDING EACH PLAINTIFF TO BE
AT FAULT.
The provision of the Utah Employment Security Act involved in this appeal is Section
35-4-S(e):
An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or for purposes of establishing a
waiting period:

For the week with respect to which he had willfully made a false statement or
representation or knowingly failed to report a material fact to obtain any
benefit under the provisions of this Act, and for the SI-week period immediately
following and until he has repaid to the fund all monies he received by reason of
his fraud and which he received during such following 51-week disqualification
period, provided that determinations under this subsection shall be . made o~ly
upon a sworn written admission, or after due notice and recorded hearmg; provided that when a claimant waives the recorded hearing a.determination shall be
made based upon all of the facts which the Commission, exercising due diligence,
has been able to obtain; and provided further that such determination shall b_e
appealable in the manner provided by this Act for appeals from other benefit
determinations.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

Defendant's regulations explaining and clarifying said section of the law are contained
in the General Rules of Adjudication of the Utah Department of Employment Security issued in April 1976. The pertinent provisions thereof are:

G_ode ~4~. l . The meaning .of the Act is clear as it pertains to the period of
d1squahf1cahon, any resultmg overpayment, the necessity of a sworn admission
or recorded hearing, appeals, etc. There are, however, essential elements that must
be present before a disqualification can be imposed against any individual for
fraud. It must be found to exist by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence; not
presumed. If direct evidence is not present, circumstantial evidence, if clear and
convincing, is sufficient for establishing a case of fraud.
In a case involving fraud or misrepresentation, the five following elements
must be present:

1. A factual representation, statement, or silence when there is a duty to speak.
Whether silence amounts to a willful misrepresentation is dependent upon the
facts of the situation and the intent of the party who fails to speak.
2. The materiality of the statement, representation, or silence. It must be
shown that the fund was prejudiced by the conduct and that it would have
affected the individual's right to benefits. A moral wrong is not a violation of
Section 35-4-5(e) unless it is material.
3. The falsity of the representation or statement.
4. The speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth or knowledge
of its importance.

5. The speaker's intention that his representation or sil~nce w~ to be acted upon
by the person to whom it was made or from whom 1t was withheld.
In summary, the individual who has either "~fu~y ma~~ a ~als~ statement .or
representation" or "knowingly failed to report 1s d1squalif1ed if his act was with
regArd to a "material fact." ....
An overpayment resulting from a determination ~ssessing ~ ~~ualifica~on
for fraud includes the total amount of benefits paid to the mdividual d~
the disqualification period. The overp~~e'?-t does. not. include any benefits p~d
for a period after the 52-week disqual1f1cat1on penod 1f such benefits were paid
prior to discovery of the fraud.
.
. . .
· dh
· d a claimant who is otherwise
After the 52-week d1squahf1cat1on peno ~ expire '
.
h m until all
eligible for benefits may file for s~ch benefits,. but ;iaJ n~~~~~;~! ~eriod have
monies he received by reason of his fraudffdunbng 1ai~d l(:ms This does not deter
been repaid, either by cash payment or o set Y v 1 c ai ·
any collection actions by the Department.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(A) PLAINTIFF MINEER
Element number 1 requiring a factual representation or silence when there is a duty to
speak is satisfied by the response of plaintiff Mineer to questions number 10 and 12 of the
Continued Interstate Claim filled out by the said plaintiff in Pasco, Washington, (R0019,
K.0029) wherein she answered "no" to the question: "Did you work or earn wages at any

time during the calendar week ending October 5, 1974?" In response to question 12-d,
plaintiff answered "no" to the question: During the week ending October 5, 1974, "were
3011 in training or attending school?"

Element 2 as regards materiality is certainly satisfied. The fund was prejudiced by
reason of the incorrect statement of the plaintiff in that she was paid benefits which she

Would not have received if she had stated the matter truthfully and correctly.
Element 3 is satisfied in that there is no question that the statements or responses to
.cpleStion 10 and question 12 on the Continued Interstate Claim were false.

·As regards Element number 4 relating to the speaker's knowledge as to the falsity of

the representation or ignorance of its truth or knowledge of its importance,

suffice it to say

at this point that the finder of the facts was amply justified in finding that this element was
present. The matter of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the finding by the referee
and the Board of Review that this element was present will be examined in detail in Point II,

infra.

As to Element number 5 respecting the speaker's intention that her representation or
silence be acted upon by the defendant, an examination of the transcript and the record
discloses that this element was also amply present justifying the Referee and Board of
Review in finding it thus. This element also will be considered in greater detail as respects
the sufficiency of the evidence to support such a finding under Point II, infra.

(B) PLAINTIFF ROSKELLEY
Element number 1 requiring a factual representation or silence when there is a duty to
speak is satisfied by the response of Plaintiff Roskelley to questions number 2a, b, and c of
the weekly claim form for the week ending April 19, 1975, filled out by said plantiff (R0030)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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said questions number 2a, b, and c of the weekly claim 1~orm ~ th
k
ior e wee ended April 26,
1975, filled out by said plaintiff (R0031) he reported work for ABC c
. .
onstruct1on eight
hours Tuesday, six hours Wednesday, and eight hours Friday, and earnings of s . ; and
132 41
in response to question number 12 stated that he started work at ABC I
A ril
nc. on p 22,
1975 (R0031).
Element 2 as regards materiality is certainly satisfied. The fund was prejudiced by
reason of the incorrect statement of the plaintiff in that he was paid benefits which he
would not have received if he had stated the matter truthfully and correctly.
Element 3 is satisfied in that there is no question that the statements or responses to
questions number 2a, b, and c of said weekly claim forms for the week ending April 19,
1975, and the week ending April 26, 1975, and to question number 12 for the week~
April 26, 1975, were false. (R0012, R0013, R0032)

tiaQt---.

~

to the knowledge of the falsity and intent that it be acted upon by the def h • di

l!J.

Regarding Elements number 4 and 5, as in the case of Plaintiff Mineer,

__ t

examined in detail in Point II, infra. Both elements, as such examination ill Paiat ll ,,..,
disclose, are amply present justifying the Referee and Board of Review in fmding it thtJs.

(C) REGARDING BOTH PLAINTIFFS

Plaintiffs refer to defendant's Regulation 340.2 which relates to Section 35-4-6(4)
and 35-4-6(e) of the Utah Employment Security Act.
Section 35-4-6(d). Any person who, by reason of his fraud, has received any sum
as benefits under this act to which he was not entitled shall be liable to repay
such sum to the Commission for the fund. If any person, by reason of his Oft
fault, has received any sum as benefits under this act to which under a redetermination or decision pursuant to this section, he has been found not entitled he shall be liable to repay such sum, and/or shall, in the discretion of the
Commission be liable to have such sum deducted from any future benefits payable to him.' In any case in which under this subsection a claimant is lia~le to
repay to the Commission any sum for the fund, such sum. shall be collectable In the
same manner as provided for contributions due under this act.

..,!

Section 35-4-6(e). If any person has received any sum as ben.efits unde~ this
act to which under a redetermination or decision he was not entitled, and it has
been found that he was without fault in the matter, he is not liable to repay such
sum but shall be liable to have such sum deducted from any fu~ure benefits
payable to him with respect to the benefit year current at the time of such
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
receipt. Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Rules of Adjudication, Code 340.2 An examination of the above sections of the
law reveals that overpayments are repayable in definitely specified ways depending
on where the fault lies or depending on the existence of fraud. The latter, of
course, must be first established as provided by Section 5(e) (See 340.1) and any resulting overpayment must be repaid to the fund. (See 340.1 concerning restitution of overpayments resulting from disqualifications under Section 5(e).)
(emphasis added)
Rules of Adjudication, Code 340. 1 After the 52-week disqualification period
has expired, a claimant who is otherwise eligible for benefits may file for such
benefits but may not receive them until all the monies he received by reason
of his fraud during the disqualification period have been repaid, either by cash
payment or offset by valid claims. This does not deter any collection actions by
the Department.
It is not necessary to apply the second sentence of Section 6(d) because in this situation

the first sentence of said section of the Act applies. Each plaintiff by reason of his/her

fraud has received benefits under the Act to which he/she was not entitled and must repay
such sum to the Commission. The Commission does not have discretion in either case where
fraud was involved as it has in the case of a person who was not guilty of fraud but who

.received benefits by reason of his own fault. It is not necessary to go into the question of
fault nor to consider the Department Regulations referred to by plaintiffs in their brief

when dealing with ones such as the plaintiffs who have become liable to make restitution by
reason of fraud under Section 5(e) of the Act.

Rules of Adjudication, Code 340.2 Fault cannot be assumed and the burden
of proving that is exists falls to the Department. When a question of fault arises, it
is usually a question of whether the person properly gave specific information
having a bearing on his eligibility. In fairness to the individual, it must first be
found that he had knowledge sufficient to make him think that the information
might be important. He is then under obligation to make proper inquiry to determine definitely what is required. Inasmuch as each claimant is advised of his
rights and responsibilities at the beginning of his claim series and since he
certifies to eligibility requirements when continuing his claims, he should have
sufficient knowledge to put him on notice that certain subjects might be important
factors relative to a claim for benefits. The claimant is then under obligation
to make proper inquiry and failure to do so constitutes fault. In summary, when
a claimant has knowledge of the importance of certain information but makes
his own determination that the information is not material of if he just simply
ignores it, he does so at his own risk. He cannot be relieved of his obligtion to
speak and his failure to do so places the fault on him.
Although it is not necessary to consider the tests set forth in the regulations to
determine fault, if such tests were to be applied the trier of the facts would be amply
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
justified in finding
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Mineer did not receive a booklet advising her of her rights and responsibilities when she
initiated her original claim. The important thing is that the Referee be convinced that in fact
the plaintiff was aware of her rights and responsibilities and that plaintiff had sufficient
knowledge to put her on notice that certain subjects might be important factors relative to a
claim for benefits. In this regard the mere fact that in order to receive benefits a form had
to be completed every two weeks and a response to questions relating to hours worked and
wages earned of any kind during specific weeks enumerated would put anyone on notice tht
such information was important relative to a claim for benefits. The same is true with
respect to the question regarding whether the claimant was in training or attending school
during the particular weeks (R0029). The same is also true as regards the importance of
reporting a paycheck when received if a claimant mistakenly did not report the same during
the week when the hours were actually worked and the money was actually earned (1\0020).
Plaintiff Mineer in this instance cannot beg the question by saying that she did not receive a
booklet at the outset when from all the circumstances it is very clear that she was on notice
that the above-mentioned matters were important factors relative to her claim for benefits.
She should have answered the questions correctly and made a proper and honest disclosure.
or at least should have made inquiry. In accordance with the regulations her failure to make
inquiry constituted fault.
With respect to Plaintiff Roskelley, it is admitted that he did receive. an
"Unemployment Insurance Handbook," advising him of his rights and responsibft;ities
(R0012, R0014, R0015), and that he was aware of its contents and the necessity to complete
the weekly claim forms correctly and in particular to report his earnings. "I knew I had to
report the money because the handbook did say that." (R0015) In order to receive benefits
each week the plaintiff was required to complete the weekly claim form and respond to the
.
. b
questions therein respecting days and hours worked and date of starting work at a new JO ·
Just above plaintiff's signature each weekly claim card provides: "My statements are
correct. 1 know the Jaw provides penalties for false statements." It is clear that plaintiff was
aware of the importance of said information. He ignored the question on his weekly claim
.

for the week ending April 19, 1975

I gross earmngs
card
regarding
hours
and tota
Sponsored
by the
S.J. Quinney
Law worked
Library. Funding
for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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r

(llflll30), and be inoorrectly '1ated the dare he '1utod work for ABC Con'1ruction

.o~

th•

~' weekly claim card for the week endmg Apnl 26, 1975 (R003 l). The Referee was 1ust1f1ed m
~,.

"~/.:ffiding, in accordance with said regulation 340.2, supra, that Plaintiff Roskelley was at

'}:;::.61llt.

POINT II
~ •/t THE FINDINGS OF THE REFEREE AND THE BOARD OF REVIEW THAT
EACH OF THE PLAINTIFFS DID KNOWINGLY WITHHOLD THE
MATERIAL FACTS OF HIS/HER WORK AND EARNINGS ARE SUP;:C,··'<"PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND ARE CONCLUSIVE.
~;:,.

!'

~'

..

. It sltould be noted that one known false statement or known failure to re-

Port a material fact to obtain a benefit is sufficient to invoke this Section

[5(e)] of
. e Act, (quoted in Point I. supra.) and that the 52-week disqualification then
*5 effect and weekly benefits thereafter recived within the disqualification
.
although pursuant to submission of perfectly honest weekly claim forms
•overpayments and must be repaid to the Department. David A. Whitcome v.
,-~ent of Employment Security and Board of Review of the Industrial ComtnisSon of Utah, Utah Supreme Court Case No. 14735, May 1977.
r .
~on 35-4-lO(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, second paragraph, provides in part:

~; la any judicial proceeding under this section the findings of the commission and

;,, ·;·tile board of review as to the facts if supported by evidence shall be conclusive

· ·· · · and the jurisdiction of said court shall be confined to questions of law.

This Court has consistently from time to time ruled that where the findings of the
Commission and the Board of Review are supported by evidence, they will not be dis-

,·
f

turbed. In this regard, the Court said in Kennecott Copper Employees v. Department

of Employment Security (1962) 13 U. 2d 262, 373 P. 2d 987:
We are obliged to analyze this determination in accordance with the established Rules of Review: that the Evidence is to be looked at in the light most
favorable to the findings: in so doing, if there is evidence of any substance
whatever which can reasonably be regarded as supporting the determination
made, it must be affirmed; and conversely, a reversal and the compelling of
such an award could be justified only if there was no substantial evidence to
sustain the determination, and there was proof of facts giving rise to the right
of compensation so clear and persuasive that the Commission's refusal to
accept it and make an award was clearly capricious, arbitrary, and unreasonable.
The findings of the Referee as affirmed by the Board of Review are amply supported
by the evidence.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(A) PLAINTIFF MINEER
Plaintiff Mineer started work for Albertson's, Inc., in Richland, Washington, on
October 3, 1974, (ROOI8, R0027, R0031) and worked for one full day and the next day for
two or three hours. On October 15, 1974, the Plaintiff filled out, signed, and submitted a
bi-weekly Continued Interstate Claim to the Employment Security Department in Pasco,
Washington. A copy of this form is Exhibit 1 attached to the transcript (R0029). The
Plaintiff admits that she filled out said claim and signed the same (R0019). Said claim
specifically required information regarding work and earnings during the week ending
October 5, 1974. Plaintiff failed to report the above work and earnings at Albertson's, Ia:~
Q This claim doesn't show any work or earnings reported. Question No. 10 asks
for you to report work and earnings. Will you read Question No. 10 aloud
for me please.
A During the week claimed in No. 7 and No. 8 above, did you wort or earn
wages of any kind? If yes, furnish the information below for each day you
worked or earned wages. Show wages before deductions.
Q That has been checked no. Did you check that no.
A Yes. (R0019)
In response to the referee's inquiry as to
the $26.28 which she earned at Albertson's, she responded that she wasn't sure that M
would be paid and "was more or less being trained." (R0019)
Q Why did you fail to report the $26.28 you earned from Albertsons during
the week of October 5th.
A As I stated before. I didn't think I was going to get paid because when I went
in for the job the man said if I worked out I could get it and I had never
worked in a meat maket like that before so I was more or less being trained.
Q You weren't sure whether you would be paid or not?
A No.

Q Question No. 12 states that during the week or weeks claimed in No. 7 and .s
above, were you and it's got multiple choices here that you answer - it
states under Item D - in training or attending school, and that's been
checked no. You told me here that you were in training and I'm wondering why
you didn't check that yes.
I don't really know it's been so long ago but proba~ly
because there's such a span of time I probably completely forgot about it.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
(R0019) Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
A Well, at the time -

Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

Tb.e Plaintiff's answers quoted above to the Referee's questions are contradictory and
:~e. First the Plaintiff said she didn't think she was going to be paid because she was

0r less being trained. In this day and age one would be hard put to find a training

where the employee is not being paid while he is being trained. Be that as it may, if
' 'ff did genuinely and sincerely feel that she was in a training program, she can't

-Why then she failed to indicate in response to question 12-d that she was engaged in
- program at Albertson's. Her answer, "Well, at the time -

I don't really know

so kmg ago but probably because there's such a span of time I probably completely

of her failure to report that she was in training.
two to four weeks later the plaintiff was in fact paid by Albertson's, Inc., for her
U)di.obc:r 3 and 4, 1974 (R0019). Certainly at this point Plaintiff was aware that she
lijl!DrltiJ!lt! for wages at Albertson's on the two days in question. However, when she

Albertson's, she failed to report said work and earnings.

, Wtn you still filing for benefits when Albertsons did pay you?

Q Why didn't you report the information at that time.
A I really didn't know I had to.
Q Didn't you know you had to report all work and earnings while filing for
benefits?

A No. $26.00 I didn't.

Q Question No. 10 that you read a moment ago states during the weeks claimed
in No. 7 and No. 8 above did you work or earn wages of any kind? That
requires a yes or no answer and you indicated no on that claim.
A I didn't know I was being paid.

Q Then on the week you did get paid you would have had earnings and still
apparently you indicated no. I don't see any claims in the record that were filed
for the next 3-4 weeks on which you recorded any work or earnings.
Sponsored
by theitS.J.
Quinney(R0020)
Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
A No,
wasn't.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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A further point which goes to the credibility of the Plaintiff was the fact that she
d I
misrepresented employers contacted when filling out Item #15 on S";d C t'
...
on mue nterstate
Claim (R0030). In listing employers, etc., she had contacted regarding work she did not list
Albertson's as having been contacted, when she did make contact and had actually worked
there during the week in question.
The Plaintiff does not dispute that she did work at Albertson's and ea.med $26.ll
during the week ending October 5, 1974, nor does she dispute that she failed tor~

tllo:

same.

(B) PLAINTIFF ROSKELLEY
On April 20, 1975, Plaintiff Roskelley signed and filed a weekly
Defendant for the week ending April 19, 1975, (R0012, R0030) whereon he•
had not worked any hours and had no earnings. Plaintiff admits tUt: i.,
said week for ABC Inc. and earned $126.11 ($132.41) (R0031)

~.,,

Q I have here a report of earnings from Associated BrlPam ·
It has a date of 25 November 1975 and it shows that durimg die
13, to April 19, 1975, you worked for them and earned $126.U.
if that information is correct or not?
A When's this?

Q The period April 13 to April 19, 1975.
A Yes. (R0012)
On the weekly claim card for the week ending April 26, 1975, which Pllllinllil&
filled out on April 27, 1975, he reported a false back to work date of
Plaintiff actually started work at ABC Inc. on April 14, 1975. (R0013, J.tQOg,
Plaintiff's purpose was to be consistent with a false representation on his claim Glt:llll
week ending April 19, 1975, that he worked no hours and had no eamings,
misrepresentation of the date of starting work on April 22, 1975, follows. If he
genuinely mistaken as regards reporting the hours worked and the earnings on the caret for
the week when he actually received his pay, he would have reported the correct date

he

returned to work and not been concerned with the need to cover up to avoid discovery of his
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'

~i;.'r-:

Plaintiff's explanation that he did not know how to fill out his weekly claim card for

~~~week ending April

19, 1975, is not believable. (R0013, R0014) All he had to do was

~~~~-.. -

~1:1-ilwc'1' the questions on the card, i.e.,

2. If you worked during the week shown above, complete
a, b,c, d

a - name and address of employer - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - b - Total hours worked each day (box labeled for each day of the week
with space to fill in the hours worked on the particular day)
· . c - Total gross earnings (before deductions) whether paid or not

were:

----------~

d - Check reason for separation from above employment:

O reduction of force,

D other (explain on reverse)

atified that Jae received the Unemployment Insurance Handbook and had read

2. ll0015) Any qaestioo that Plaintiff might have had after reading the plain
above for completing Item 2 of the weekly claim card would have been

by the handbook. Quoting from the decision of the Appeals Referee:
·1' !,
·~

''Unemloyment Insurance Handbook" which the claimant received clearly

';.~ that all work and earnings should be reported for the week in which the

· Hrvices were performed although the claimant may not yet have been paid. In
• addition there is an example showing how the claim should be completed ....
(1..0010)

Plaintiff Roskelley worked during the week ending April 26, 1975, and earned $255.04.
(R0032) Having worked that week Plaintiff cannot claim that it makes no difference as
just simply being reported in the wrong week because it resulted in Plaintiff receiving

11Ddeserved benefits. He did not atempt to pay them back until the Defendant contacted the
Plaintiff as part of its investigation of the matter. (R0025)
In light of the testimony, exhibits and other evidence in the record above cited, the
Referee and Board of Review were justifiably convinced that the Plaintiff Mineer when
filing said Interstate Claims and the Plaintiff Roskelley when filing said weekly claims,
knowingly withheld the material facts of his/her said work and earnings to obtain benefits
to which he/she was not entitled. The evidence in support of the decisions as reviewed herein was clear, cogent and convincing, and thus satisfied and exceeded the standard of proof
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required by the regulations of Defendant (General Rules of Adjudication, Code 340.1) The
decisions of the Referee and the Board of Review being supported by the evidence are
therefore conclusive. (UCA 35-4-lO(i)

POINT III
SECTION 35-4-5(e), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED, IS
CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND REQUIRES THAT AN INDIVIDUAL
SHALL BE INELIGIBLE FOR BENEFITS OR FOR ESTABLISHING A
WAITING WEEK FOR THE WEEK WITH RESPECT TO WHICH HE DID
THE ACTS OR OMISSIONS SPECIFIED IN THE LAW AND FOR TlJE
51-WEEK PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING. IT CANNOT BE CONSTRUED TO IMPOSE THE DISQUALIFICATION PERIOD PROSPECTIVBLY.
Section 35-4-5 of the Utah Employment Security Act sets forth various criteria

foli

termining that an individual shall be ineligible for unemployment insurance tt.e&s.
of the factors which cause ineligibility for varying periods of time are as folows:
a. Voluntarily leaving work without good cause -

2 to 6

wma

iBllidldUtj

starting with the week he voluntarily left work without good cause.
b. Being discharged for misconduct -

2 to 10 weeks inelipDility,

with the week discharged.
c. Failure without good cause to apply for or accept available suitable

wO.tk· ' 4 ·

2 to 6 weeks ineligibility, starting with the w~ek of such failure.
d. Unemployment due to stoppage of work because of strike -

startiai ~" ;;)
-~

.

the first week a specified individual is unemployed due to a strike and. ccm-

"

tinuing each week during said strike.
e. Willfully making a false statement or representation or knowingly failing to
report a material fact to obtain a benefit under the act - 52 weeks ineligibility
starting with the week of the false representation or failure to report a
material fact.
f. Receiving or seeking benefits from some other state -

starting the first

week and continuing during each week that he receives or is seeking unemployment insurance benefits in another jurisdiction.
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~

Registered at and attending school -

starting the first week and continuing

·'. , during each week that he is registered at and attending school.
. a.=ving or entitled to receive wages in lieu of notice, accrued vacation,
'~

*· _ starting the first week and

continuing during each week that he

,ti,ceives, or is entitled to receive, said wages in lieu of notice, accrued vaca.

,.

; • wds employed by institutions of higher education during summer vaca.

~

vacation between terms - starting the first week and continuing dur-

•·eadt week of said vacations.
specifies that the ineligibility shall start the
the particular condition or circumstance is extant and not the week that

tfile 52-week disqualification period of Section 5(e) is a long and harsh
• However, there are other disqualifications mentioned above which could be
~jliislp~ifk:ation

under "g" for being registered at and attending school would

for several years. Item "d", unemployment due to stoppage of work
~e.

could continue for an indefinite period of time. It is true that of all of the

mentioned above which could cause a disqualification, the one which is most
.result in an overpayment is ·the 5(e) fraud provision which is involved in this

Under item "c," failure to apply for or accept available suitable work, frequently

· ~ will be paid before the

failur~ is discovered and an overpayment will have accrued .

. Vmlm the other disqualifications there will not usually be an overpayment involved unless

·t'he claimant has misrepresented or failed to disclose, in other words, unless there is a
Section 5(e) fraud involved. For example, under item "g," registered at and attending

school, a claimant on his original claim for unemployment benefits might misrepresent that
he was not registered at and attending school when he actually was attending school. In such
case he would receive unemployment benefits in the usual course until it was discovered that
he was not eligible because of school attendance. The benefits he received during the
disqualification
periodLaw
would
constitute
overpayment
and
would
applyServices
as
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well as 5(g)-5(e) because he knowingly failed to report the m t 'al ..
f .
a en 1act o his school
attendance to obtain benefits.
With respect to those disqualifications mentioned above which set a specific number of
weeks of disqualification, the disqualification for fraud 5(e) is by f th 1
·
,
,
ar e ongest, i.e., 52
weeks. It is understandable that the Legislature was reasonably and justifiably most
concerned with fraud as compared with the other reasons justifying disqualification. Thu
in order to discourage the obtaining of benefits through "fraud" as it is defined in the~'
the Legislature set up the 52-week disqualification, starting with the week with
which the fraud was committed.
Section 5(e) of the Act is not ambiguous and is clear as to when the
period shall start. No doubt there are those who do not agree with the way ti..
and think that some other way would be better. Until the Legislature chaupai61
courts declare it to be unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, we have no chofd 118
what the Legislature has done.
If the law were to provide as Plaintiffs propose to change it the

sa:m: ..r.

could occur. Under the hypothetical scheme Plaintiffs propose if A he
disqualification period invoked as of the date that the fraud is discovered,
any benefits. If B does not have a job during a similar disqualification pellio.r;
benefits which he would have been entitled to except for the discovery of his · .
would have suffered no actual loss of benefits because he had a job, whereas•
felt the sting of the disqualification and been deprived of benefits because he

¥Ml··

job during the disqualification period as proposed by Plaintiffs.
Under the plan which Plaintiffs propose as well as under the law as it presedy st
the individual who has a job during the disqualification period will not feel the sting

otttf

disqualification, whereas under both the person who is out of work during tlW
disqualification period will feel the sting of the disqualification. Under the law as it s~ ~
the individual must repay to the Department the benefits mistakenly paid to him when lleWal··
not eligible. Under the plan of Plaintiffs the disqualified individual normally would not
. me
· Iig1'ble and he would
have to repay benefits because the Department would declare him
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-1

r:llOlTeOcive benefits. The net effect;, the •wne in both '"''"· Undec the law "' it ;, the
~,

,

.-

~~/--ble claimant receives benefits prior to discovery of the fraud which me must repay;
...,i:.,.·

.

under Plaintiffs' plan he would receive no benefits. In both cases he comes out with

One Porsche, 526 P 2d 917 (1974) in

• brief regarding penalty, forfeiture, and excessiveness of the penalty. It would seem that

"ty (3 to 2) held in One Porsche that the purpose of the criminal statute involved in
was to deter the transportation of a controlled substance for distribution and not
. possession and consumption. Reference is made in the decision to absurd results
apply from enforcement of the literal wording of the statute respecting possession

m the

majority of the court felt were not in line with the intent of the

Tlte dissent seemed satisfied from the record that Defendant was engaged in
a controlled substance for distribution while the majority felt that the

the Court mentions the point of harshness of the penalty as applied to
ki!IRssession of marijuana and the idea that forfeitures are frowned upon in law, it
appear that the decision was really based upon the fact that the statute was aimed at
_...,....;ation for purpose of distribution and not possession, and the Court would not
the rigorous forfeiture provision in a case not within the intent and purpose of the
· ~lamre, i.e., possession for personal consumption.
The Section 5(e) disqualification which is before the court is not a penalty in the sense
that Plaintiffs are assessed with a charge for wrongctoing such as a fine. By committing the

"fraud" as defined in the Act, the Plaintiffs became ineligible for benefits for a 52-week
period of time. The money which he/she received while ineligible each held as a trustee. It
did not belong to them. Each has a duty to return it to the rightful owner, i.e., the
Unemployment Compensation Fund.
The Section 5(e) disqualification is also not a forfeiture in the sense of a divestiture of
property without compensation. (36 Am. Jur. 2d, Forfeiture and Penalties, Section I.) The
money received by Plaintiffs during the disqualification period did not belong to him/her.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18

In the One Porsche case, supra, the defendant owned the car originally and the proceeding
was to transfer title to the sovereign. Here, the proceeding in question is a matter of
recovering back from the Plaintiffs money which belongs to the Fund which Plaintiffs hold
as trustees for the benefit of the Fund.
The purpose of the Employment Security Act is to assist those unemployed persons
who are entitled to cash benefits, and the purpose of Section 5(e) of the Act is to discoiirage
fruad and to encourage honesty and complete and full disclosure on the part of all claimants
for benefits under the Act. The Legislature has deemed it proper in order to achieve ks saitl
purpose of honesty and full disclosure, to require a rigorous deprivation of benefits in . tke.

·j<

nature of a penalty against a person for fraud as it is defined in the Act. CertaiDly to ~ ·• :: ,
the sort of fraudulent conduct which the trier of the facts has found to have l!llla.
mitted by the Plaintiffs in this case was directly within this purpose of tile I

~- "'!;· .
~.

•• • 'i<--.:. ..

.•,;:~

.,;ew...

The Utah Supreme Court has already considered the severity of sllclJ depriutiaa

f!!t ·

benefits in the case of Decker v. Industrial Commission. Depart,,,.,, tlf .,,.,,,.• •

Security, 533 P. 2d 898 (1975) and found that "under the statute it does not appeu ~'
fact finder or this court has the discretion to reduce or to forgive any part of tbe paid,lrtJ
The ruling in Decker, supra, would seem to be controlling in this instance.

POINT IV
SECTION 35-4-5(e), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDBD;
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF THE CQN...
STITUTIONS OF UTAH AND THE UNITED STATES.
Plaintiffs state on page 19 of their brief that it is a requirement of Defendants that the
funds received by Plaintiffs during their 52-week disqualification period must be repaid
before either will again be eligible for unemployment compensation. This is not correct. The
requirements of Defendants in this regard are set forth in Defendant's General Rules of
Adjudication, Code 340.1, quoted supra under Point I.
After the 52-week disqualification period has expired, a claimant who . is
otherwise eligible for benefits may file for such benefits, but may not receive
them until all the monies he received by reason of his fraud during the disqualification period have been repaid, either by cash payment or offset by valid claims.
Sponsored
by the
S.J.not
Quinney
Law
Library.
Funding for
digitization
provided
by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
This
does
deter
any
collection
action
by the
Department.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19

After the

52-we~k

disqualification period has expired the Plaintiffs can again file for

benefits. He/she must meet all of the other eligibility requirements of the law. If he/she
does, be/she will be entitled to Unemployment Compensation Benefits but would not
actually receive them because they would be set off against the amount of the overpayment
owed by Plaintiffs to the Fund. When the full amount owed has been offset, Plaintiffs
would then be entitled to receive the weekly cash benefits so long as he/she is still eligible.

Section 5(e) and Section 6(d) of the Utah Employment Security Act clearly do not
operate arbitrarily or capriciously or unreasonably. It would seem to be quite normal and

reuonable to offset the amount due from a claimant on an overpayment before paying a
·/.

dllialllnt benefits in a new benefit year.

U.C.A. 35-4-22(d) (1) "Benefit year" means the 52 consecutive week period
Mcinning with the first week with respect to which an individual files for
benefits and is found to have an insured status.

Also said sections do have a very real and substantial relation to the object of the act to

r,.

provide benefits to those entitled to them and to discourage fraud and to encourage

':

llCnesty and full disclosure on the part of claimants for benefits.

~·.·

~

"'

POINTV
SECTION 35-4-5(e) AS APPLIED BY DEFENDANTS DOES NOT DENY
PLAINTIFFS EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONS OF UTAH AND THE UNITED STATES.
There is nothing in the constitution which guarantees unemployment compensation to any person. Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 531 P. 2d 870
(1975).
The Utah Supreme Court in Townsend v. Board of Review of the Industrial Com-

mission, 493 P. 2d 614 (1972) considered the Utah Employment Security Act in connection with equal protection of the law guaranteed by the constitution of Utah and the United
States. The Court quoted from Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S. Ct. 1153, 25 L.
Ed. 2d 491 (1970) in enunciating the rule:
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some "reasonable basis," it does not offend .the
simply
because
theforclassification
"isbynot
made ofwith
mathematical
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nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality." (Citation) "The problem of government are practical ones and may justify if they do not require
rough acco~~o~ati~ns - illogical, it may be, and un;cientific," (Citation)
statutory. d1scnmmat1on will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may
be conceived to justify it." (Citation)

"A

* * * * *
. . · But the E9ual Protection Clause does not require that a State must choose
be~we~n atta~kmg every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.
(C1tat1on) It 1s enough that the State's action be rationally based and free from
individious discrimination ....
It is hard to think of a more reasonable or logical classification than the one in this

case. Those who have received benefits to which they were not entitled must repay them.
Those who have not received benefits that they were not entitled to have nothing to repay.
The classification which Plaintiffs complain of is really the basic classification of the
Employment Security Law. Those who are not employed and otherwise eligible reGC!in
money each week from an agency of the Government. Those individuals who are D drflld_
and working receive no such weekly payment. If employed people received the -

J&Y-

ment each week from the agency as those who are unemployed, then the classification whieh
the Plaintiffs complain of would no longer exist.

CONCLUSION
The findings of fact and decisions of the Appeals Referee as affirmed by the Board of
Review in respect to both Plaintiffs are in compliance with Defendant's regulations relating
to fraud and standard of proof. The evidence in support of the decisions in both case$ .
substantially exceeds the test of Kennecott Copper Employees v. Department of

Employment Security, supra page 10, that "if there is evidence of any substance whatever
which can reasonably be regarded as supporting the determination made, it must be
affirmed."

u.C.A. 35-4-5(e) 1953, as amended, is clear and unambiguous and cannot be construed
to impose the disqualification period prospectively after the date of the discovery of the
fraud as Plaintiffs propose. Said Section 5(e) as applied does not violate Due Process or
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Equal Protection. After the 52-week disqualification period has expired, if Plaintiffs are
otherwise eligible, each may qualify for benefits. They would be applied on the
overpayment owed by each Plaintiff to the Department. Such procedure of applying
atenring benefits on the overpayment rather than paying directly to Plaintiffs is quite

normal and not at all arbitrary or capricious. The classification complained of by Plaintiffs
is "rationally based and free from invidious discrimination.'' Dandridge v. Williams, supra
page 20. The decision of the Referee and the Board of Review in this case should, therefore,

t.e affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
ROBERT B. HANSEN,
Attorney General
FLOYD G. ASTIN
WINSTON M. FAUX
Special Assistants
Attorney General
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